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Abstract
Social group identity plays a central role in political polarization and inter-party conflict. Here,
we use ambiguously valenced faces to measure bias in the processing of political ingroup and
outgroup faces, while also accounting for interparty differences in judgments of emotion at
baseline. Participants identifying as Democrats and Republicans judged happy, angry, and
surprised faces as positive or negative. Whereas happy and angry faces convey positive and
negative valence respectively, surprised faces are ambiguous in that they readily convey positive
and negative valence. Thus, surprise is a useful tool for characterizing valence bias (i.e., the
tendency to judge ambiguous stimuli as negative). Face stimuli were assigned to the participants’
political ingroup or outgroup, or a third group with an unspecified affiliation (baseline). We
found a significant interaction of facial expression and group membership, such that outgroup
faces were judged more negatively than ingroup and baseline, but only for surprise. There was
also an interaction of facial expression and political affiliation, with Republicans judging
surprise more negatively than Democrats across all group conditions. However, we did not find
evidence for party differences in outgroup negativity. Our findings demonstrate the utility of
judgments of surprised faces as a measure of intergroup bias, and reinforce the importance of
outgroup negativity (relative to ingroup positivity) for explaining inter-party biases.
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Before casually revealing your political views in an unfamiliar setting, it may be wise to
consider the risks. If your listeners agree with you, this exchange may have a positive impact,
signaling to them that you belong. However, if your listeners happen to hold dissimilar views, a
small but revealing remark may be enough to hurt your rapport. Research on political groups in
the United States shows that discourse across party lines and ideological camps is likely to elicit
strong negative feelings (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015; Brandt et al., 2014). Even
when political views are not central to an interaction, negative attitudes towards members of a
political outgroup (based on party membership or ideology) may influence perceptions more
broadly. For example, political outgroup members are less desirable both as romantic partners
and employees (Iyengar et al., 2019; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), and looking at pictures of
outgroup politicians is enough to evoke a negative emotional response (Kaplan, Freedman, &
Iacoboni, 2007). The impact of political partisanship in the United States may, in certain
avenues, even rival or exceed that of race (Brandt et al., 2014), engendering more divisiveness
(Iyengar et al., 2012) and discrimination (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). This suggests that a full
understanding of American political partisanship requires us to consider the psychological
impact of membership in a political group and the ways in which this membership shapes
individuals’ social identity (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015, 2018; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Like other kinds of social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the mere application of
membership labels in political groups may be sufficient to give rise to bias. Research among
non-political groups has shown that even when group membership is assigned at random (i.e., in
a minimal group paradigm), individuals exhibit bias based on their arbitrary membership (Otten,
2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). While some have suggested that intergroup bias is primarily
driven by preferential attitudes towards one’s ingroup (i.e., ingroup enhancement/favoritism;
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Brewer, 2017), political intergroup bias in the United States may be driven by negative
behaviors/attitudes directed at outgroup members (Iyengar et al., 2019; i.e., outgroup
derogation/discrimination). Indeed, partisans in the United States commonly cite negative
impacts of “the other party’s policies” as a major reason for their chosen partisan identity/leaning
(Pew Research Center, 2016). In other words, party allegiance may have more to do with
negative feelings towards the opposing party rather than positive feelings towards one’s own
party (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). Moreover, the Republican and Democratic parties are
becoming increasingly dissimilar in their ideology (Mason, 2015), policy (Grossmann &
Hopkins, 2015), and demography (Finkel et al., 2020). The impact of this widening rift can be
felt in the current atmosphere of intense partisan animosity and distrust, with more people
viewing the other party’s policies as a “threat to the nation’s well-being” (Pew Research Center,
2016). Thus, rather than being motivated by loyalty to their group, the aversive prospect of being
subject to the will of an antithetical opponent may be a strong driver of political intergroup bias
in the United States.
In addition to impacting interpersonal attitudes (e.g., engendering disliking of outgroup
members), intergroup bias can be detected in individuals’ judgments of others’ emotions. For
example, recent work using a minimal group paradigm has shown that facial expressions are
judged more positively when belonging to an ingroup member compared to an outgroup member
(Lazerus et al., 2016). In fact, individuals were more likely to make positive judgments of
ingroup faces (relative to outgroup faces) even when viewing a negative facial expression.
Importantly, this bias toward judging ingroup affect as positive is conceptually distinct from
other intergroup biases in interpersonal perception (e.g., a bias towards ascribing more positive
traits to ingroup members relative to outgroup members). Nonetheless, given that trait
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judgments, like trustworthiness, are highly related to valence judgments (Todorov, 2008), we
may expect that the extent to which intergroup attitudes and perceptions are more strongly driven
by ingroup versus outgroup bias should be mirrored in judgments of emotion for ingroup and
outgroup facial expressions. Specifically, aforementioned findings showing a more dominant
role for outgroup derogation/discrimination (rather than ingroup enhancement/favoritism) in
driving political intergroup bias in the United States may suggest that partisans’ tendency to
interpret outgroup emotion as negative will be stronger than their tendency to interpret ingroup
emotion as positive. Such an effect would suggest that the tendency for outgroup bias to take
primacy in partisan attitudes extends to the domain of emotion perception.
The impact of political intergroup bias on affective processing may be exacerbated when
a facial expression is inherently ambiguous (i.e., the expression is associated with more than one
emotional meaning). For example, while some expressions convey a relatively clear positive
(e.g., happy) or negative (e.g., angry) meaning, a surprised face is ambiguous in that it can be
elicited in response to a positive (e.g., an unexpected visit from an old friend) or a negative event
(e.g., witnessing a robbery). While the effect of emotional ambiguity in the context of intergroup
bias is unclear, some have suggested that interpretations of ambiguous facial expressions may
skew in the direction that confirms or justifies pre-existing beliefs and attitudes (Harp et al.,
2021; Pauker et al., 2010). If so, responses to such expressions could offer unique leverage to
detecting intergroup bias; we would expect interpretations of an ambiguous facial expression
(e.g., a face expressing surprise) to lean more positive when conveyed by an ingroup member,
and perhaps to a greater degree, to lean more negative when conveyed by an outgroup member.
Comparing responses to ambiguous facial expressions across political groups can also
reveal whether intergroup bias is exacerbated by individual differences in the baseline tendency
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to interpret ambiguous facial expressions as negative (i.e., valence bias). Responses to emotional
ambiguity exhibit trait-like individual differences – some individuals have a negative valence
bias and are consistently drawn to negative interpretations, while others have a positive valence
bias and are consistently drawn to positive interpretations (Neta et al., 2009; Harp et al., 2022).
Notably, U.S.-based conservatives, compared to liberals, are more sensitive to negative stimuli
(Hibbing et al., 2014), and show higher levels of several factors that can contribute to a more
negative valence bias (e.g., need for closure, intolerance for ambiguity; Hibbing et al., 2014; also
see Fournier, Soroka & Nir, 2020). Thus, measuring and controlling for these preexisting
differences is essential to isolating the effect of perceived group affiliation on shifting one’s
baseline valence bias when judging ambiguous emotions of political ingroup and outgroup
members.
The present work examines the effect of others' group affiliation (i.e., ingroup/outgroup
members) and one’s own political party identification (i.e., Republican/Democrat) on
interpretations of emotional ambiguity. To this end, participants viewed uncategorized (i.e.,
baseline), ingroup, and outgroup faces, and judged them as positive or negative. It was expected
that participants’ perceptions of the emotional expressions would be influenced by the group
affiliation of the faces, displaying patterns of both ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity.
More specifically, it was hypothesized that:
H1. Participants will judge ingroup surprised faces as more positive than uncategorized faces
(ingroup positivity).
H2. Participants will judge outgroup surprised faces as more negative than uncategorized
faces (outgroup negativity).
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We also expected to replicate previously documented findings showing that Republicans
are more likely than Democrats to arrive at negative interpretations of ambiguously valenced
stimuli (Hibbing et al., 2014). Thus, we hypothesized that:
H3. Republicans will judge surprised faces more negatively than Democrats.
Finally, we planned to follow up on any observed differences in judgments of surprise by
examining the extent to which participants were attracted to the unselected response option – i.e.,
the extent to which participants experienced “response competition” when making their
judgments. To that end, we planned to look at the Maximum Deviation (MD) of mouse
trajectories, which index attraction towards the competing response option when making these
judgments. Specifically, we explored post-hoc hypotheses probing the extent to which MD
differences across positive and negative judgmnts of surprise (which have been observed in past
studies; Brown et al., 2017; Neta, Berkebile, & Freeman, 2021) might interact with group
affiliation and participants’ party identification.
Method
Participants
Target sample size was initially set at 100 (50 Republicans and 50 Democrats), then
raised to 120 to correct for unbalanced group sizes and neutrally affiliated participants (see
below). This sample size and adjustment were determined before any data analysis. We recruited
119 student participants through the Psychology Department’s undergraduate student subject
pool using online postings and text/email invitations. Seven participants were excluded because
they did not believe the experimental manipulation, and 17 additional participants were excluded
for expressing a neutral political affiliation (see details under Questionnaires). There were no
other exclusions to report in this study. The final sample comprised 95 participants, ages 17-50
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years (Republicans: M(SD) = 19.68(1.81); Democrats: M(SD) = 19.93(4.88); t(59) = 0.31, p =
0.75, d = 0.07)1. Participants included 42 Democrats (27 females; 35 strong, 7 leaning) and 53
Republicans (33 females; 36 strong, 17 leaning; see more details about party identification under
Questionnaires). A sensitivity power analysis of difference between two means computed using
G*Power (α = .05, two-tailed) showed that, when collapsing across parties, this sample size
provided adequate power (80%) to detect a small effect (d = 0.29).
Protocols were approved by the University of ------ Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects. The entirety of the study was conducted in the same private room at the
University of ------, and each participant only saw/interacted with the researcher. Participants
provided their written consent at the start of the session and were compensated for their time
through course credit. All measures and manipulations are reported below and in sections 1-2 of
the Supplementary Materials.
Stimuli
Face stimuli were obtained from the Umeå (72 faces, Samuelsson et al., 2012), NimStim
(28 faces, Tottenham et al., 2009), and Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (20 faces, Goeleven
et al., 2008) databases, and were selected based on hit rate to maximize accuracy of expression.
All images depicted faces of Caucasian individuals in full front-view presented in the upright
position. A total of 120 faces were used to create three equivalent sets of 40 faces, with each set
comprising 10 angry faces (5 female), 10 happy faces (5 female), and 20 surprised faces (10
female). Stimulus hit rate ranged from 62 to 100 (M(SD) = 94.12(6.85)), and was equated within

1

Aside from one Democratic participant who was 50 years old, all participants were between the ages of 17 and 22.
The subject in question was not excluded from the analysis, as age was not an exclusion criterion in this study.
Notably, removing this subject from the analysis does not change the observed pattern of results reported here.
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each expression condition across the three sets (e.g., the average hit rate of happy faces was
closely matched across sets).
Each set of 40 faces was presented in a separate block (see below) and randomly assigned
to represent one of three groups: a group of Democrats, a group of Republicans, and a group for
whom affiliation was not specified (uncategorized). This face set assignment was
counterbalanced, such that each set was assigned to each of the three groups (Democrats,
Republicans, and uncategorized) an equal number of times across participants. This
methodological choice allowed us to control for any inherent facial differences in perceived
ideological leaning (Olivola, Tingley, & Todorov, 2018; Rule & Ambady, 2010) or any other
trait impressions, as well as any differences in the apparent valence of faces within the same
emotional expression (e.g., some faces looking happier than others in the case of happy faces).
Faces assigned to the uncategorized condition were always presented first, and were used to
measure a baseline response prior to any mention of political party membership.
Face Judgment Task
In a within-subjects design, each participant viewed each of the three sets of faces
(displayed one face at a time) in separate blocks. Within each block, the order of face displays
was pseudorandomized, such that surprised faces occurred after happy and angry faces an equal
number of times. This was done in order to mitigate potential priming effects that may have
influenced the perceived valence of surprise. Faces were presented on a computer screen (image
size 256 × 397 pixels, screen resolution 1280 x 1024 pixels) on a white background using
MouseTracker (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). All participants were seated in an upright position,
approximately 63.5 cm from the computer screen (horizontal viewing angle = 6.07°, vertical
viewing angle = 9.31°). Before the second and third blocks, an instruction screen indicated the
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party affiliation of the group of faces in the upcoming block. The researcher read the block label
("You are now going to see faces that belong to individuals that identify as ---”) and informed
the participant that the task was otherwise the same.
The first block of trials assessed baseline valence bias (see Figure 1). Participants viewed
faces assigned to the uncategorized group (for which party affiliation was not mentioned). At the
beginning of each trial, participants saw a black fixation cross for 500 ms. After, participants
used the mouse to click a start button at the bottom center of the screen to initiate the judgment
phase of the trial. The use of the start button to initiate trials in this manner ensured that
participants returned the mouse cursor to the same position before making a response. Clicking
the start button triggered the presentation of a face for 500 ms, followed by a response screen. To
respond, participants made their face “ratings” (which they were instructed to do as quickly and
accurately as possible) by clicking on one of the two response options (“POSITIVE” and
“NEGATIVE”) visible in the top left and right corners of the display (counterbalanced across
participants). Although these response options were visible during the face presentation,
participants could not see or move the cursor to make a response until the face display was over.
The trial ended once the participant clicked on a response.
In the second and third blocks, participants viewed the faces assigned to the Democrat
and Republican conditions. The order of these last two blocks was counterbalanced such that
about half of the participants viewed faces belonging to the same political party to which they
identified (ingroup) followed by faces belonging to the opposing party (outgroup), while the
other half viewed outgroup faces followed by ingroup faces. Before starting each block,
participants were told that the faces in those blocks belong to individuals who self-identify as
Democrats/Republicans, and were reminded to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
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Figure 1. Face judgment task. In a within-subjects design, participants viewed three sets of
faces in three blocks: Uncategorized faces (A), followed by Democrat (B) or Republican
faces (C), where the fixation cross was replaced by the label “DEMOCRAT” or
“REPUBLICAN” for each trial. The order of the second and third blocks was
counterbalanced such that half of the participants saw faces associated with their ingroup
first and half saw outgroup first. Participant clicked a start button at the bottom center of
the screen, then saw a face for 500 ms, which they were instructed to “rate” as positive or
negative with the computer mouse.
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These blocks proceeded identically to the first block, except that the fixation cross in between
trials was replaced by a label in black font and all caps indicating the assigned party affiliation
(i.e., “DEMOCRAT” or “REPUBLICAN”) displayed for 500 ms.
To allow for a closer examination of the impact of ambiguity (Brown et al., 2017) and
group membership (Lazerus et al., 2016) on the participants’ decision-making process,
MouseTracker (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) was used to record participants’ judgments, as well
as their mouse trajectories and reaction times during the response portion of the task (i.e.,
immediately after face presentation and until the participant clicked on a response button).
Mouse trajectories always began at the start button, where the cursor remained locked throughout
face presentation. Maximum Deviation (MD) of mouse trajectories was calculated for each trial
as an index of response competition throughout the participants’ decision-making process
(Calcagnì et al., 2017; Freeman et al., 2011; Hehman et al., 2015). MD is the maximal extent to
which the cursor deviated from a straight-line mouse trajectory from the start button (at the
bottom center of the screen) to the selected response option (on the top right or left corner of the
screen) on a given trial. This deviation indexes the extent to which participants were attracted to
the alternative (competing) response option; the more difficulty experienced suppressing the
alternative response, the greater the MD for that trial. As such, examining participants’ MD
provided unique insight into the effect of group conditions on these judgments of facial
expressions.
Questionnaires
After the face judgment task, participants completed a series of questionnaires
administered using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). First, we measured political affiliation in all
participants in order to prevent any impact of the other scales on an individual’s party
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identification. Political affiliation was assessed using the 7-point party identification scale
developed by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (i.e., the Michigan Measure;
American National Election studies; www.electionstudies.org). Participants were asked
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?”. Participants who did not explicitly identify as Democrats or Republicans
received a follow-up question to assess leaning: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic party?”. Participants indicated their leaning on a 7-point scale, where
1 represented strong Republican leaning and 7 represented strong Democratic leaning. Of the
119 participants recruited for this study, 17 participants expressed a neutral affiliation (a score of
4 on the leaning scale), and were therefore excluded from the study and did not complete the
remaining questionnaires. Of the 95 participants that did complete the experiment, 7 were
leaning toward the Democratic Party (leaning scores ranging from 5 to 7) and 17 were leaning
toward the Republican Party (leaning scores ranging from 1 to 3). These participants were
treated as Democrats/Republicans, as previous work suggests that leaners tend to behave more
like partisans than independents (Petrocik, 2009). We also note that post-hoc analyses indicated
that excluding the 24 leaners did not change the observed pattern of results (see section 1.2 of the
Supplementary Materials).
Next, participants completed free response questions that attempted to probe the extent to
which they believed the experimental manipulation. Specifically, participants typed short
responses to this series of questions (note that the order of the words Democratic/Republican was
randomized across participants):
1. “What was the difference between the three groups of faces you viewed?”
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2. “Overall, did you feel differently about the Democratic faces versus the Republican
faces?”
3. “Did you find the Democratic faces and the Republican faces to be different in how
negative/positive they were?”
One participant was excluded for explicitly stating that they did not believe the
manipulation: “I assumed that the labels ‘Democrat’ and ‘Republican’ were arbitrarily assigned
to faces and were not actual descriptions of the real people.” Additionally, 6 more participants
were excluded for erroneously believing that one or more faces belonging to the same
individuals were repeating across blocks (e.g., believing that the same faces appeared as both a
Democrat and a Republican). For example, one participant believed they “saw some of the same
faces pop up in both parties”. Participants completed additional questionnaires that were outside
the scope of this report; a full description of which can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
Analyses
Data analyses were conducted in R version 3.6.2 (R Core Team, 2017). We calculated the
percentage of surprise trials judged as negative as our measure of valence bias in each block. We
fit a linear mixed effects model to condition mean data to explore these percent negative
judgments, using random intercepts for each subject and subject x within-subjects factor to
account for the within-subject variance. The lmerTest package (Kusteznova et al., 2016) was
used to calculate F tests and p-values and the effsize package (Torchiano, 2020) was used to
calculate Cohen’s d. All post hoc contrasts were completed with the emmeans package (Lenth et
al., 2020) and any contrasts reported as significant passed Bonferroni correction for significance
threshold. Finally, we fit linear mixed effects models for Maximum Deviation (MD) of mouse
trajectories on condition mean values, as we did with percent negative judgment. Analyzing MD
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as a function of subjective judgments (positive vs. negative) resulted in an unbalanced dataset
with some missing values (e.g., if a participant only judged surprise as negative, then there
would be a missing value for MD for surprise judged as positive). This resulted in 28 out of 570
missing values (5.17%). Full information maximum likelihood estimation was used in all linear
mixed effects models to account for any missing data.
Results
Negativity Judgments
Using judgments from the uncategorized condition as a baseline, we fit a Group
Affiliation (within-participants: uncategorized, ingroup, outgroup) x Expression (withinparticipants: surprised, angry, happy) x Party Identification (between-participants: Democrat,
Republican) linear mixed effects model on percent negative judgments (see Figure 2 and Table 1
for a summary of descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of Expression (F(2, 281) =
1980.92, p < .001), such that angry faces (M(SD) = 0.99(0.03)) were judged as more negative
than surprised faces (M(SD) = 0.71(0.18), t(194) = 18.13, d = 1.94), which were judged as more
negative than happy faces ((M(SD) = 0.02(0.05), t(194) = 42.54, d = 5.22); ps < .001;
Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .016). There was also a main effect of Group Affiliation
(F(2,194) = 11.44, p < .001) showing that, while judgments of baseline (M(SD) = 0.59(0.11))
and ingroup faces (M(SD) = 0.59(0.11)) were not significantly different from one another (t(194)
= 0.54, p = .589, d = 0.03), outgroup faces (M(SD) = 0.63(0.11)) were judged more negatively
than both the baseline (t(194) = 4.34, d = 0.36) and ingroup faces (t(194) = 3.80, d = 0.33 ;ps <
.001; Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .016). Notably, there was a significant Expression x
Group Affiliation interaction (F(4, 380) = 6.67, p < .001), such that this pattern of results was
unique to judgments of surprised faces (baseline (M(SD) = 0.68(0.21)) versus ingroup (M(SD) =
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0.68(0.21)): t(582) = 0.03, p = .975, d = 0.00; outgroup (M(SD) = 0.75(0.21)) versus baseline:
t(582) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.32; outgroup versus ingroup: t(582) = 5.78, p < .001, d = 0.32;
Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .005). All other comparisons did not survive the corrected
threshold (ps > .190, but note that there was a trending effect that did not survive correction
where outgroup happy faces were judged as more negative than baseline p = .036). In sum, while
these findings did not provide support for our first hypothesis (i.e., evidence of ingroup positivity
in judgments of surprise), they were in line with our second hypothesis (i.e., evidence for
outgroup negativity).
Table 1: Percent Negative Judgments Across Conditions

Percent Negative Judgments

Group Affiliation
Uncategorized
Ingroup
Outgroup
Party Identification
Democratic
Republican

Angry M (SD)

Happy M (SD)

Surprise M (SD)

.99 (.03)
.99 (.04)
.99 (.05)

.01 (.03)
.02 (.07)
.03 (.09)

.68 (.21)
.68 (.21)
.75 (.21)

.99 (.02)
.99 (.03)

.03 (.06)
.02 (.05)

.66 (.20)
.74 (.16)

Party Identity

Group Affiliation
Figure 2. Negativity judgments. Outgroup faces were judged more negatively than Ingroup
and Uncategorized, but only for surprise (p < .001). Republicans judged surprise more
negatively than Democrats (p = .001). Error bars represent standard error.
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As for our third hypothesis, although the main effect of Party Identification only
approached the traditional significance threshold (F(1, 280) = 3.20, p = .075), where Republicans
(M(SD) = 0.62(0.08)) appeared to be more negative than Democrats (M(SD) = 0.59(0.01) , d =
0.40), there was a significant interaction of Expression x Party Identification (F(2, 281) = 3.90, p
= .021), suggesting that Republicans judged surprised faces (M(SD) = 0.74(0.16)) more
negatively than Democrats (M(SD) = 0.66(0.20); t(291) = 3.27, p = .001, d = 0.41; Bonferronicorrected threshold = .016). There was no Party Identification difference in judgments of angry
(t(291) = 0.10, p = .919, d = 0.08) and happy (t(291) = 0.29, p = .773, d = 0.12) faces.
Response Competition When Judging Surprised Faces
Next, we examined Maximum Deviation (MD) as a measure of response competition
when judging the ambiguously valenced surprised faces, with greater MD in mouse trajectories
indicating greater response competition (see Tables S1 and S2 for a summary of descriptive
statistics).
We started by examining MD during the baseline (uncategorized faces) block. This
allowed us to avoid potential confounding effects of task habituation (i.e., a training effect), as
the baseline block always occurred first, whereas the ingroup and outgroup conditions were
counterbalanced.2 For our primary analysis, we fit a linear mixed effects model with effects of
Surprise Judgment (within-participants: positive, negative) x Party Identification (betweenparticipants: Republican, Democrat) on MD (see Figure 3A). There was a main effect of Surprise
Judgment, such that there was greater MD for positive (M(SD) = 0.53(0.37)) than negative
judgments (M(SD) = 0.27(0.27); t(95) = 5.07, p < .001, d = 0.75), consistent with prior work
2

Results of an analysis including all three group conditions is reported in section 3 of the Supplementary Materials.
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(Brown et al., 2017; Neta, Berkebile, & Freeman, 2021). This suggests that positive judgments
are associated with greater attraction to the competing (negative) response option. There was also
a significant interaction of Surprise Judgment x Party Identification (F(1,184) = 8.52, p = .004);
Republicans had greater MD than Democrats when surprise was judged as positive (Republicans
M(SD) = 0.62(0.35); Democrats M(SD) = 0.41(0.38); t(188) = 3.00, p = .003, d = 0.56), but not
when it was judged as negative (Republicans M(SD) = 0.24(0.26); Democrats M(SD) =
0.31(0.28); t(188) = 1.05, p = .296, d = 0.26; Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .0125). We also
compared MD across positive and negative judgments of surprise within each party: Republicans
had significantly greater MD when judging surprise as positive (M(SD) = 0.62(0.35)) than
negative (M(SD) = 0.24(0.26); t(95) = 6.00, p < .001, d = 1.20), but this difference was not
significant among Democrats (positive M(SD) = 0.41(0.38); negative M(SD) = 0.31(0.28); t(96)
= 1.46, p = .147, d = 0.25; Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .0125). Overall, the findings
suggested positive judgments are associated with more competition, more so for Republicans
than Democrats.
Next, we examined MD during ingroup and outgroup blocks as a function of participant
political party identification. We fit a linear mixed effects model with effects of Surprise
Judgment (within-participants: positive, negative) x Group Affiliation (between-participants:
ingroup, outgroup) x Party Identification (between-participants: Republican, Democrat; see
Figure 3B). There was no main effect of Group Affiliation on MD (F(1, 181) = 0.24, p = .625),
and no significant interactions involving Group Affiliation (ps ≥ .660). Thus, we did not find
evidence to support our (exploratory) hypothesis that MD for positive versus negative judgments
varied as a function of Group Affiliation.
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All other effects replicated findings in the uncategorized condition, with one exception.
Within the Surprise Judgment x Party Identification interaction, which approached traditional
levels of significance (F(1, 96) = 3.66 , p = .059), the difference in MD of positive judgments
across Party Identification was no longer significant (Republican M(SD) = 0.46(0.31), Democrat
M(SD) = 0.37(0.21); t(194) = 1.52, p = .130, d = 0.33; Bonferroni-corrected threshold = .0125).
Interestingly, in addition to Republicans showing the same effect as above, with greater MD
when judging surprise as positive than negative (positive M(SD) = 0.46(0.31), negative M(SD) =
0.21(0.18), t(96) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 0.97), Democrats now also showed a similar trend,
although the effect did not survive Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (positive
M(SD) = 0.37(0.21), negative M(SD) = 0.26(0.19); t(95) = 2.53, p = .0129, d = 0.56; Bonferroni-

Party Identity

Surprise Judgment

Surprise Judgment

Figure 3. Party differences in response competition when judging surprise. (A) Surprise
trials with uncategorized faces. When surprise was judged as positive, Republicans showed
greater attraction to the competing (negative) response options than Democrats (p = .003).
This difference was not significant when surprise was judged as negative (p = .30).
Republicans also showed greater attraction to the competing response when judging surprise
as positive compared to negative (p < .001), but this difference was not significant among
Democrats (p = .15). (B) Surprise trials with party labeled faces, collapsed across ingroup
and outgroup. Similar to uncategorized faces, Republicans showed greater attraction to the
competing response when judging surprise as positive compared to negative. However, for
group judgments, Democrats did show a similar trend, although the effect did not survive
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (p = .0129, Bonferroni-corrected threshold =
.0125). Error bars represent standard error.
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corrected threshold = .0125). In other words, while Republicans consistently showed attraction to
the competing response when judging surprise as positive, both in this analysis of ingroup and
outgroup blocks and in the previous baseline analysis, Democrats only showed – albeit weak –
evidence of response competition in the presence of information regarding others’ party
membership.
Finally, we note that, in addition to MD, we also analyzed Reaction Time (RT) as a
secondary indicator of response competition. As expected, RT findings largely replicated those
of MD (see section 4 of the Supplementary Materials).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated the effect of group affiliation on valence bias among
Republicans and Democrats by leveraging interpretations of emotional ambiguity. We examined
valence judgments for faces belonging to ingroup members, outgroup members, and individuals
who were not assigned a group category (uncategorized) serving as a baseline. We predicted that
participants’ judgments of emotionally ambiguous (i.e., surprised) facial expressions would
reveal underlying intergroup bias in affective processing, such that judgments of ingroup faces
would be more positive than uncategorized (H1), and outgroup faces would be more negative
(H2). We also predicted that Democrats and Republicans would differ in their responses to
ambiguity, such that Republicans’ judgments of surprise would be more negative compared to
Democrats’ (H3). Finally, we conducted follow-up analyses that explored the effect of group
affiliation and party identification on attraction to response competition across judgments of
surprise.
Our findings provided partial support for our predictions. Specifically, we found evidence
for an outgroup negativity bias in judgments of surprised faces; surprised faces belonging to
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outgroup members were more likely to be judged as negative compared to surprised faces of
uncategorized or ingroup affiliation. Conversely, judgments of uncategorized and ingroup
surprised faces did not differ from one another. Additionally, as predicted, judgments of
surprised faces differed across Republicans and Democrats; Republicans in our sample
demonstrated evidence of a negativity bias towards surprised faces – indexed by both negative
judgments and a greater attraction to the negative response. Finally, despite this alignment across
judgments and response competition for surprised faces that was evident for party identification,
this pattern of results did not extend to group affiliation. Namely, while we observed an outgroup
negativity bias in judgments of surprised faces, we did not find evidence for intergroup
differences with respect to response competition (e.g., attraction to the negative response when
judging surprise as positive).
Our findings highlight the importance of separately examining political intergroup bias in
judgments of ingroup and outgroup emotion, as we found that participants’ valence bias in
response to partisan faces were driven by outgroup negativity and not ingroup positivity. These
findings align with claims that political partisanship in the United States may be primarily driven
by outgroup bias rather than ingroup bias (Iyengar et al., 2019), and extend these claims by
demonstrating a parallel pattern for bias in the emotion perception domain. Why might outgroup
bias take primacy in American cross-party interactions? In the greater context of intergroup
emotion processing, a bias towards outgroup negativity sacrifices accuracy to reduce the
likelihood of a more costly outcome: being caught off guard by an ill-intentioned outgroup
member. Given the widening ideological and demographic rift between the two parties (Mason,
2015; Grossmann & Hopkins, 2015; Finkel et al., 2020), this cost may be particularly high, as
the losing party is forced to contend with the victorious party enacting policies that are perceived
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as “a threat to the nation’s wellbeing” (Pew Research Center, 2016). Future work can shed light
on the extent to which this outgroup bias is exacerbated by specific features of the American
political arena (e.g., two party systems) by exploring this pattern of findings in other countries
with more political parties (e.g., Israel) or countries where ideological/political views are more
homogeneous (e.g., Netherlands).
Despite relying on a highly controlled paradigm, we argue that participants’ experience in
this study does have key real-world parallels that support generalizability beyond the
experimental setting. In this study, faces in the ingroup and outgroup blocks were labeled as
“Democrat” or “Republican”, providing participants with an explicit cue to the political
identification and group affiliation of the targets in question. While observers do not typically
have such direct access to others’ party membership in the real world, they may be sensitive to
several visually available cues that can predict others’ political views with some level of
accuracy. For example, individuals may be able to make first-glance predictions about the
political affiliation of those around them based on common stereotypes about the parties’
average demographics (age, sex, race, etc.), or based on probabilistic detection of how
demography uniquely relates to ideology in one’s own community. Relatedly, some work shows
that observers form predictions about others’ political affiliation based solely on thin slice
judgments (i.e., trait impressions from faces; Olivola, Tingley, & Todorov, 2018; Rule &
Ambady, 2010). As such, while individuals do not normally see faces paired with a label
indicating party membership, seeing such labels may approximate the experience of generating
an instantaneous prediction about others’ political views based on their appearance.
Limitations
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One potential limitation of this work is the reliance on a design where ingroup faces and
outgroup faces are presented in separate blocks. This design may have allowed the participants to
respond in a simplistic manner (e.g., simply responding “negative” to outgroup faces, without
paying attention to the faces per se). However, our findings suggest that the group affiliation of
the faces did not likely dictate participants’ responses across the different expressions.
Specifically, while we did find an effect of group affiliation on judgments of surprised faces,
there were no such effect observed for angry faces and there was only a trending effect for happy
faces that did not survive correction. Indeed, the vast majority of participants (more than 80%)
judged angry faces as negative and happy faces as positive on every trial, regardless of group
affiliation. This pattern of results shows that, even when information about political group
membership was presented using explicit labels in a block design, participants were not
responding in a simplistic manner. Rather, our findings seem to reflect legitimate differences in
emotion processing driven by participants’ underlying bias towards political outgroup members.
Another potential limitation is that, when making their judgments, participants were
simply instructed to categorize each face as positive or negative. Instructions were kept brief in
order to facilitate spontaneous responses, and to be consistent with prior work (Neta et al., 2009;
Harp et al., 2021). However, this simplicity could have also introduced a limitation to this study,
as it left the instructions open to interpretation. Participants may have been judging the
expression itself, the underlying emotion, or their own emotional state. Moreover, participants
may have relied on different interpretations of the task across the different group conditions.
Future work involving judgments of facial expressions may benefit from providing more explicit
instructions or even simply debriefing participants about their criteria for what makes a face
positive or negative. Based on our limited data to this effect, participants’ judgments may have
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reflected various inferences about the individuals being viewed, as written responses showed that
some participants made trait attributions, describing outgroup faces as “annoying”,
“condescending”, “judgmental”, etc. Similarly, two participants wrote that the happy faces
expressed by the opponent party seemed “smug”, and another described the “meaning” of a
target’s smile being different depending on their party affiliation. These responses suggest that
such trait attributions may have been closely linked to participants’ valence judgments -- a
phenomena that has been documented in previous work (Todorov, 2008). Thus, the group-based
shift in valence bias observed in this study could be interpreted as a biproduct of skewed face
trait attributions and an underlying bias in interpersonal impressions and/or attitudes.
Lastly, methodological limitations may have hindered our ability to explore the patterns
of response competition experienced during face judgments. Specifically, after determining that
participants’ judgments of surprise showed an outgroup negativity bias, we followed up by
examining Maximum Deviation (MD) as an indicator of response competition. Contrary to our
expectations, we did not find an interaction in MD between group membership and surprise
judgments (positive versus negative), which would have suggested that response competition is
modulated by group membership. Although the uncategorized condition provided a useful
baseline to compare judgments of ingroup and outgroup faces, we noted that the uncategorized
condition had greater MD than both the ingroup and the outgroup conditions (see section 3 of the
Supplementary Material). This may point to a training effect that dwarfed the MD difference
between the ingroup and outgroup, making it more difficult to detect. However, excluding the
uncategorized condition from the analysis did not change the pattern of results. Another likely
explanation is that the effect of the group condition on response competition occurred at the
earliest stages of the decision-making process (i.e., at the onset of the face presentation).
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Unfortunately, our task design failed to capture this stage of the response, as participants were
unable to move the mouse during face presentation. Future work should prioritize recording
mouse trajectories beginning with the stimulus onset to more fully explore these processes.
Implications
The findings of this study highlight important social-affective phenomena with several
implications for our understanding of political prejudice in the United States. First, our findings
successfully demonstrate that political group membership can shift individuals’ valence bias,
skewing one’s judgments of ambiguous emotions. Facial expressions are important non-verbal
cues that convey a message to the perceiver, and the ability to accurately decipher the emotional
content of a facial expression is an essential part of effective social interaction. Our findings
suggest that bias towards outgroup members can impair this ability, possibly leading individuals
to misconstrue the intentions of outgroup members and giving rise to conflict, disagreements, or
polarization. Even altering the perceived valence of a social interaction with a single outgroup
member can have ripple effects, as interactions with individual outgroup members can shape
attitudes towards the outgroup as a whole (Stark, Flache & Veenstra, 2013; Yu et al., 2020). If
so, our findings could indicate that social interactions involving ambiguous emotional states may
carry the potential to exacerbate preexisting intergroup bias. Future work can examine whether
these findings extend beyond judgments of faces – e.g., by using ambiguous words (Harp et al.,
2021) that were reportedly taken from text written by individuals from different political parties.
Future work can also elucidate the link between valence bias and other forms of prejudiced
beliefs/behaviors by examining individual differences in endorsement of group-based
stereotypes, or allocation of resources in economic games (e.g., the trust game; Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006).
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Finally, our findings demonstrate that outgroup negativity bias is distinct from partisan
differences in baseline negativity. On the one hand, both Republicans and Democrats exhibited a
more negative valence bias when viewing surprised facial expressions belonging to the outgroup,
consistent with the view that members of both parties hold prejudiced attitudes towards the
rivaling political outgroup. In contrast, Republicans in our sample exhibited a stronger overall
bias towards negativity, as well as a stronger attraction to the negative response at baseline.
However, our findings did not suggest that Republicans’ stronger bias towards negative
judgments of surprise was specific to outgroup emotion, nor that there were partisan differences
in judgments thereof. Notably, while the overall tendency for Republicans to be more negative
than Democrats is in line with prior findings linking conservatism to negativity (Hibbing et al.,
2014), we did not find a link between conservatism and judgments of surprise (see section 2 of
Supplementary Materials). Rather, the baseline differences identified in this study were
associated with participants’ political party identification. Interestingly, more recent findings
suggest that the aforementioned association between conservatism and physiological responses
to negative emotional stimuli may not replicate in non-American samples (Fournier, Soroka &
Nir, 2020). As such, future work is needed to further probe the unique effects of political
ideology and party identification on valence bias to better understand the underlying differences
in emotion processing – e.g., by examining the effect of individual differences in ideology within
political parties. Future work can also test whether individual differences in valence bias can
predict voting behavior or endorsement of policies that tend to evoke different moral values
across parties (Graham et al., 2009).
While we focus here on intergroup effects related to political party identification, future
work will also be critical in determining the implications for non-political intergroup relations, as
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biased interpretations of emotional ambiguity may be particularly damaging to interactions
across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups. For instance, geographic and/or cultural
differences among ethnic groups may contribute to different norms of social and emotional
expression (Soto et al., 2005). As a result, a bias toward interpreting ambiguous emotional cues
from the outgroup as negative suggests that subtle differences in cultural norms may be sufficient
to create (or reinforce) negative stereotypes.
Conclusions
Overall, this work demonstrates that the social dimension of political identity plays an
important role in shaping judgments of ambiguous social cues, putatively shaping inter-party
attitudes and interactions. Indeed, in the absence of any other cues to evoke political or
ideological disagreements, party labels alone were sufficient to elicit a shift in valence bias –
driven by outgroup negativity rather than ingroup positivity – among both Democrats and
Republicans. This aligns with the idea that, rather than being driven exclusively by ideological or
policy differences, political prejudice in the United States is the product of social and affective
processes that may persist even in contexts where political views might otherwise be irrelevant
(Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015, 2018). Future work integrating social, affective, and political
psychology will be critical to our understanding of how this bias emerges, why it differs across
individuals, and how best to mitigate its harmful effects on political prejudice in the United
States and other countries with similar patterns of partisanship.
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